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Abstract
We extend the epistemic logic with De Morgan negation by Fagin et al. (Artif. Intell.
79, 203–240, 1995) by adding operators for universal and common knowledge in a group
of agents, and with a formalization of information update using a generalized version of
the left division connective of the non-associative Lambek calculus. We provide sound
and complete axiomatizations of the basic logic with the group operators and the basic
logic with group operators and updates. Both logics are shown to be decidable.
1 Introduction
Belnap’s epistemic interpretation of First Degree Entailment [3, 4] shows that FDE is useful for
reasoning about incomplete and potentially inconsistent information. FDE is not, however, an
epistemic logic in the standard sense since its language does not contain operators expressing
epistemic attitudes of agents. Such an extension of FDE was provided by Levesque [22] and
brought closer to classical epistemic logic by Fagin et al. [17]. These frameworks were originally
put forward as an attempt to avoid the logical omniscience problem of classical epistemic
logic, and so, to keep unnecessary complications out of the picture, they do not contain any
additional operators utilized in the successful applications of classical epistemic logic, such as
group epistemic operators [16] or operators expressing various kinds of information update
[13, 6].
In this paper we extend the framework of Fagin et al. [17] with operators expressing
universal and common knowledge in a group of agents (Section 2) and with a conditional
operator, coming from the Non-associative Lambek Calculus, expressing information update
(Section 3). These two basic logics are axiomatized and shown to be decidable; extensions
are briefly mentioned, but are mostly left for future work (which is discussed in Section 4.)
∗This is a preprint of an article to appear in the proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Logic,
Rationality and Interaction (LORI-VII), Chongquing 2019, to be published by Springer. This work was
supported by the Czech Science Foundation grant GJ18-19162Y for the project Non-classical logical models of
information dynamics. The authors are grateful to three anonymous referees for their feedback.
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Related work. Non-classical modal logic with epistemic and information-dynamic oper-
ators is underdeveloped. Girard and Tanaka [18] study a paraconsistent logic containing
explicit revision operators. (This paper follows up on [28] and [23], but these do not discuss
Hintikka-style epistemic logics with revision operators; rather, they consider paraconsistent
versions of AGM-style belief revision.) Rivieccio [30] studies an FDE-based version of Public
Announcement Logic. Both of these papers contain only single-agent epistemic operators.
An FDE-based group epistemic logic with universal and common knowledge is a fragment
of paraconistent Propositional Dynamic Logic studied in [31, 32]. B´ılkova´ et al. [10] outline
an extension of their substructural epistemic framework with common knowledge, but com-
pleteness is left for future research. The relation between substructural logic and classical
information dynamics is studied in [5, 7] and [1], for example; [15, 27] discuss an information-
dynamic interpretation of the Routley–Meyer semantics for some substructural logics. Restall
[27] considers a ternary relation between sets of situations, but the framework considered in
Section 3 is original to this paper.
2 FDE with group epistemic operators
In this section, we add to the framework of FDE with material implication, based on [17],
modal operators representing universal knowledge in groups of agents (“everyone knows that
...”) and common knowledge. Firstly, we provide the basic definitions (Subsection 2.1),
then we discuss the informal interpretation of the framework (2.2) and our technical results,
namely, a weakly complete axiomatization and a decidability result for the basic logic of the
framework (2.3). The proof is given in the technical appendix.
2.1 Group language and group frames
Fix a finite non-empty set Ag (“agents”) and a countable set Prop of propositional variables.
The language LGr of FDE with material implication and group modalities contains
• unary connective ∼ (De Morgan negation)
• binary connectives ∧,∨ and ⊃ (lattice conjunction and disjunction, material implica-
tion);
• unary operators KG, K
∗
G for each non-empty G ⊆ Ag (group epistemic modalities)
Fix any p ∈ Prop and define ⊤ := p ⊃ p, ⊥ := ∼⊤ and ¬ϕ := ϕ ⊃ ⊥. Formulas ∼ϕ are
read “ϕ is false” and ¬ϕ as “ϕ is not true”; in our setting, these will not be equivalent. Sets
G ⊆ Ag represent groups of agents; KGϕ is read “Every agent in G knows that ϕ” and K
∗
Gϕ
as “It is common knowledge in G that ϕ”. We define Kaϕ := K{a}ϕ and read this as “Agent
a knows that ϕ”.
Group frames are 〈S, {Ra}a∈Ag, ⋆〉 where each Ra is a reflexive binary relation on S and
⋆ is a unary function of period two (that is, ⋆(⋆(x)) = x for all x ∈ S). We usually write x⋆
instead of ⋆(x). Moreover, we define
RG :=
⋃
a∈G
Ra R
∗
G :=
(
RG
)∗
2
Group models add to group frames a valuation function v : Prop → P(S). For each model
with v, we define the satisfaction relation v as usual when it comes to propositional variables
and Boolean connectives; moreover, we require that
x v ∼ϕ iff x
⋆ 6v ϕ
x v KGϕ iff ∀y(RGxy =⇒ y v ϕ)
x v K
∗
Gϕ iff ∀y(R
∗
Gxy =⇒ y v ϕ)
We sometimes use the notation v(ϕ) = {x | x v ϕ}. Formula ϕ is valid in a model with S
and v iff v(ϕ) = S; it is valid in a frame iff it is valid in all models based on the frame and it
is valid in a class of frames iff it is valid in all frames in the class. This notion of validity will
be used throughout the paper. For any language L, the L-theory of a class of frames is the
set of all L-formulas valid in the class of frames.
It is easily seen that v(⊤) = S and so v(¬ϕ) = S \ v(ϕ). Hence, even though Boolean
negation is not a primitive connective of our language, it can be expressed using material
implication and De Morgan negation.
2.2 Informal interpretation
In group frames, elements of S are called situations and can be seen as situations in the
sense of Barwise and Perry [2], either concrete ones (parts of the world) of abstract ones
(representations of parts of the world, either accurate or inaccurate). Mares [24] discusses
situations in the presence of De Morgan negation and we follow his interpretation, according
to which situations may be incomplete (some ϕ is neither true nor false, i.e. neither ϕ nor ∼ϕ
is satisfied in the situation) and inconsistent (some ϕ is both true and false); we note that
Barwise and Perry also allow “incoherent” situations [2, 96]. Levesque [22] uses the concept of
a situation in a similar way; we note that this interpretation of the elements of S is consistent
with Belnap’s interpretation in terms of “simple databases” [3, 4]. Existence of incomplete
and inconsistent situations follows from our truth condition for ∼ϕ in terms of “the Routley
star” ⋆, which is thought of as an operation assigning to each situation its dual ; intuitively,
the dual situation of x makes true everything that is not made false in x and vice versa. In
general, we read x v ϕ as “ϕ is true in situation x (on v)”, or “The information that ϕ is
supported by x (on v)”.
The informal interpretation of “epistemic accessibility relations” Ra differs only slightly
from the standard reading of Kripke models for classical epistemic logic. Our basic idea is
that, for each situation x and each agent a, there is a part of x that is available to a in the
sense that a knows that it is a part of x. For instance, of the situation comprising the building
in which my department is situated, only the part comprising my office is available to me at
the moment, but upon receiving information from a colleague about something happening
on a different floor, a bigger part of the situation becomes available to me. The fact that
Raxy is taken to mean, informally, that the part of x available to a is included in y. Hence,
our truth condition for Kaϕ means that Kaϕ is supported (true) in x iff each situation that
contains the part of x available to a supports ϕ—we may say that Kaϕ is supported in x iff
the information available to a in x supports ϕ.
A note of caution is in order here, however. The elements of our models correspond to
prime situations in the sense that x supports a disjunction iff it supports one of its disjuncts.
“Parts” of situations, as we use the term, may not be prime in this sense. For instance,
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each prime situation containing the fact that Ann has one sibling contains the fact that Ann
has one brother or the fact that Ann has one sister, but only the information that Ann has
one sibling may be available to me, without me knowing if the sibling is male or female. A
disjunction may be supported by a part of a situation without either disjunct being supported
by that part. “Parts” of situations in this sense are not necessarily elements of the model, but
they may be represented by sets of elements of the model; intuitively, the set representing
a particular “partial” situation comprises all prime situations in the model that contain all
the information in the partial situation. For instance, the partial situation supporting only
the information that Ann has one sibling can be represented by the set comprising two prime
situations differing in the gender of the sibling. See [3, 4] for details. Hence, we may speak of
Ra(x) := {y | Raxy} as representing the part of x available to a—it follows from reflexivity
of Ra that each ϕ supported by all situations in Ra(x) is supported by x.
Let us turn now to the relations used in the satisfaction clauses for group operators. The
fact that RGxy means that y contains the part of x available to some a ∈ G. Hence, KGϕ
is supported in x iff all agents in G have information that supports ϕ. The fact that R∗Gxy
means that (x, y) is in the reflexive transitive closure of RG. (In fact, speaking of transitive
closure is sufficient as all the relations are reflexive; we speak of reflexive transitive closure out
of custom). In other words, there is a finite path z0 = x, z1, . . . , zn−1, zn = y such that, for
all k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, (zk, zk+1) ∈ Ra for some a ∈ G. Note that (x, z) ∈ Ra and (z, y) ∈ Rb
means that z contains the a-part of x and y contains the b-part of y. This means that KaKbϕ
is supported in x iff the a-part of x “says” that the b-part of x supports ϕ. In other words,
a knows that b knows that ϕ. Hence, K∗Gϕ is supported in x iff, in a standard manner, each
agent in G knows that all the agents know that ... all the agents know that ϕ.
Belnap [3, 4] motivated FDE as a logic useful for reasoning about simple databases contain-
ing potentially inconsistent information; this reasoning involved only information formulated
using ∼,∧ and ∨. The epistemic extension of FDE by Fagin et al. [17] can be seen as a logic
for reasoning about potentially inconsistent databases where the relevant information may
involve Ka, that is, where information about information available to individual agents is in-
volved. Here inconsistency may be encountered at least on two levels. Firstly, a database may
contain inconsistent information about the information of agent a, that is, it may contain Kaϕ
and ∼Kaϕ for some ϕ. In contrast to epistemic logic based on classical logic, the framework
of [17] allows to reason with such databases without “explosion”, i.e. without inferring any
ψ whatsoever. Secondly, a database may contain information that the information of agent
a is inconsistent, that is, it may contain Kaϕ and Ka∼ϕ for some ϕ. In contrast to classical
epistemic logic, the framework of [17] does not force the conclusion that, in this case, Kaψ
holds for any ψ whatsoever. The upshot of our group FDE is that these features are lifted to
group epistemic notions—we have here a logic useful for reasoning about potentially inconsis-
tent information, including information about information available to groups of agents that
may turn out to be inconsistent on the two levels mentioned above in connection to individual
knowledge operators.
2.3 Completeness and decidability
The axiom system GrFDE contains the following axiom schemata and rules (X ∈ {K,K∗}):
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(A0) Any fixed axiomatization of the
{∧,∨,⊃}-fragment of classical proposi-
tional logic
(A1) ϕ ⊃ ∼∼ϕ
(A2) ∼∼ϕ ⊃ ϕ
(A3) (∼ϕ ∧∼ψ) ⊃ ∼(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(A4) ∼(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (∼ϕ ∨ ∼ψ)
(A5) XGϕ ∧XGψ ⊃ XG(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A6) XGϕ ⊃ ϕ
(A7) KGϕ ⊃⊂
∧
a∈GKaϕ
(A8) K∗Gϕ ⊃ KG(ϕ ∧K
∗
Gϕ)
(R0) Modus Ponens
(R1)
ϕ ⊃ ψ
∼ψ ⊃ ∼ϕ
(R2)
ϕ
XGϕ
(R3)
ϕ ⊃ KG(ψ ∧ ϕ)
ϕ ⊃ K∗Gψ
Theorem 1. GrFDE is a sound and weakly complete axiomatization of the LGr-theory of
all group frames. The theory is decidable.
Since Boolean negation is expressible in our language, Theorem 1 can be established using
the standard technique ([16, Ch. 3.1]). In the technical appendix, we give an alternative
“modular” proof, based on [26], that does not invoke Boolean negation and, as such, can
be used in a setting where Boolean negation is not expressible (e.g. when specific weaker
negations are used instead of De Morgan negation; see Sect. 4).
3 Almost arbitrary information updates
In this section, we extend our framework with a formalization of information update. Instead
of focusing on one specific notion of update, such as public announcements, belief revision or
the various notions of belief upgrade, we provide a somewhat more general account. Taking
inspiration from van Benthem [8], we add to our semantics an abstract representation of
updates and we study the general framework arising from this addition. (See also [19] for
a nicely generalizable framework, based on abstract update relations, for the fragment of
Public Announcement Logic closed under substitution; both frameworks bear some similarity
to the general semantics for conditional logics [12].) An interesting endeavour is to relate the
abstract semantics to known notions of update via special cases of the general framework,
but we leave such investigations for future work.
Similarly to the framework of [8], information updates are represented as binary relations
between elements of the model indexed by subsets of the model. Instead of pointed models in
van Benthem’s “update universe”, elements of our models are prime situations. This feature of
the model derives from the goal of formulating a general representation of information update
on an inconsistency-tolerant background. The indexing set of situations, “the proposition
triggering the update” [8, 32], corresponds to the information content of the update. We
do not assume the content of an update to correspond to a prime situation; typically the
“incoming” information corresponds to a part of a prime situation. (Recall that parts of
prime situations are represented in our framework by sets of prime situations.)
Hence, an update relation on a set of situations S is a function from the power set of
S (all possible “triggering propositions”) to binary relations on S (“situation transitions”).
Equivalently, we may represent an update relation by R ⊆ (S×P(S)×S) (RxY z iff (x, y) is
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in the transition determined by the triggering proposition Y ). In what follows, group update
frames are 〈S, {Ra}a∈Ag, R, ⋆〉 where R is such an update relation.
In modal logics of information update we typically have formulas specifying the results
of information update depending on the nature of the “triggering proposition”; in general,
the interesting feature is whether updates of a certain kind are guaranteed to lead to outputs
satisfying specific formulas. Here we will distinguish updates with based on information
supported by the “triggering proposition”.
The language LGrUp extends LGr with a binary connective \; formulas ϕ\ψ are read
“After updating with any information supporting ϕ, ψ will hold”. Group update models add
a valuation function v to group update frames and the satisfaction relation v is defined as
usual; for X ⊆ S, X v ϕ means that x v ϕ for all x ∈ X. The new clause in the definition
of v is the following:
x v ϕ\ψ iff (∀Y )(∀z)
(
(RxY z & Y v ϕ)⇒ z v ψ
)
Validity is defined as before. Note that \ is a generalized version of the left division operator of
the Non-Associative Lambek Calculus [14, 20, 29]. There the truth condition uses individual
situations y, not sets of situations.
We read RxY z as “Updating x with the partial situation Y may result in z”. Hence,
ϕ\ψ is true in x iff ψ holds in every possible result of updating x by a partial situation that
supports ϕ.
The proof system GrUpFDE extends GrFDE with
(A9) (χ\ϕ ∧ χ\ψ) ⊃ χ\(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(R4)
ϕ1 ⊃ ψ1 ϕ2 ⊃ ψ2
ψ1\ϕ2 ⊃ ϕ1\ψ2
(R5)
ϕ
ψ\ϕ
Theorem 2. GrUpFDE is a sound and weakly complete axiomatization of the LGrUp-theory
of all group update frames. The theory is decidable.
Using Boolean negation, we may define a “diamond version” of the update operator \ as
ϕ ◦ ψ := ¬(ϕ\¬ψ). It is clear that
x v ϕ ◦ ψ iff (∃Y )(∃z)
(
RxY z & Y v ϕ & z v ψ
)
Note that the connective ◦ is not what is usually called fusion in the literature on substructural
logic; the update operator \ is not a residual of ◦. An axiomatization of the theory of all group
update frames in languages where ◦ is present as a primitive operator and Boolean negation
is not expressible is an open problem. (This is the case even for the language {∧,∨, \, ◦} and
the 〈S,R〉-reducts of group update frames.)
4 Conclusion
In this paper we outlined two FDE-based epistemic logics, the basic logic with universal
and common knowledge, and its extension with a generalized left division operator of the
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Non-associative Lambek Calculus, formalizing an abstract notion of information update. We
established axiomatization and decidability results for these logics.
Among topics that we leave out of the present paper is a study of axiomatic extensions
of GrFDE and GrUpFDE. It is especially natural to consider extensions of GrFDE by
various introspection axioms, such as positive introspection Kaϕ ⊃ KaKaϕ, Boolean negative
introspection ¬Kaϕ ⊃ Ka¬Kaϕ and De Morgan negative introspection ∼Kaϕ ⊃ Ka∼Kaϕ.
Regarding extensions of GrUpFDE, it is interesting to take a look at how our framework ac-
commodates some typical properties of special cases of information update (e.g. monotonicity
ϕ\χ ⊃ ϕ\(ψ\χ) or “success” ϕ\ψ ⊃ ϕ\(ϕ ∧ ψ); the latter seems to require an extension of
our frames with a partial order on the set of situations in the style of the Routley–Meyer
semantics for substructural logics [29].)
Another topic for future research are specific language extensions of our logics. A par-
ticular instance is related to the iterated update operator \∗, where ϕ\∗ψ is read as “ψ holds
after any finite number of updates by ϕ”. A natural semantics for this operator is obtained
by defining
R1xY z := RxY z Rn+1xY z := ∃Uv(RxUv & RnvY z)
and
R∗ := {〈x, Y, z〉 | (∃n ∈ N)(RnxY z)}
and requiring that
x v ϕ\
∗ψ iff ∀Y z((R∗xY z & Y v ϕ) =⇒ z v ψ)
We conjecture that a complete axiomatization of the theory of all group update frames with
R∗ is obtained by adding to GrUpFDE the following:
(A10) (χ\∗ϕ ∧ χ\∗ψ) ⊃ χ\∗(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A11) ϕ\∗ψ ⊃ (ϕ\ψ ∧ ϕ\(ϕ\∗ψ))
(A12) (ϕ\(ϕ\∗ψ)) ⊃ (ϕ\∗ψ)
(R6)
ϕ1 ⊃ ψ1 ϕ2 ⊃ ψ2
ψ1\∗ϕ2 ⊃ ϕ1\∗ψ2
(R7)
ϕ ⊃ ψ\ϕ
ϕ ⊃ ψ\∗ϕ
(On some assumptions concerning the update relation R, ϕ\∗ψ can be expressed in a
language containing fusion and the Kleene star operator; see [11]. Our setting intends to be
more general. Also, the presence of Boolean negation, some of these assumptions concerning
R lead to undecidability; see [21]. It was shown in [25] that the classical Public Announcement
Logic with an operator for iterated announcements is undecidable. Hence, the question is,
which notions of update admit a decidable logic with iterated updates? Our general setting
is especially suitable for such investigations, but they need to be left for future research.)
Another interesting topic are generalizations of the framework using weaker notions of
negation than De Morgan negation used here. In general, negation can be seen as a negative
modal operator with the satisfaction clause
x v ∼ϕ iff ∀y(R∼xy =⇒ y 6v ϕ)
using an arbitrary binary relation R∼. If this relation is not serial, then Boolean negation
cannot be expressed and some of the standard techniques used in completeness proofs for
logics with common knowledge (and other fixpoint) operators cannot be used.
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A Proofs
Let L be any set of formulas containing all substitution instances of propositional tautologies
in {∧,∨,⊃} that is closed under Modus Ponens and Uniform substitution. We say that a set of
formulas ∆ is L-derivable from a set of formulas Γ, notation Γ ⊢L ∆, iff there is γ =
∧
Γ′ ⊆ Γ
and δ =
∨
∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that γ ⊃ δ is in L. We note that
∧
∅ := ⊤, so if ∆ contains an
element of L, then Γ ⊢L ∆ for all Γ. We say that 〈Γ,∆〉 is an independent L-pair iff Γ 6⊢L ∆.
A prime L-theory is any set of formulas Γ that i) contains L, ii) is closed under ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ L
(that is, if ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ L and ϕ ∈ Γ, then ψ ∈ Γ) and iii) contains ϕ ∨ ψ only if it contains ϕ or
ψ. A prime L-theory is called non-trivial iff it is not the set of all formulas.
Theorem 3 (Pair Extension). If 〈Γ,∆〉 is an independent L-pair, then there is a non-trivial
prime L-theory Σ extending Γ that is also disjoint from ∆.
Proof. Essentially [29, 92–95]. We note that
∨
∅ := ⊥, so Σ cannot contain any χ such that
χ ⊃ ⊥ is in L; hence Σ has to be non-trivial.
We note that in order for the Pair Extnesion Theorem to hold it is crucial to define L-
derivability in a “finitary” way; see [9].
Theorem 1. GrFDE is a sound and weakly complete axiomatization of the LGr-theory of
all group frames. The theory is decidable.
Proof. Soundness is left to the reader as an exercise. Completeness is established using a
variant of the standard finite canonical model construction (see e.g. [16, Ch. 3.1]). The
argument used here is based on [26].
Assume that ϕ0 is not provable in GrFDE. Let the closure of ϕ0, Cl(ϕ0), be the smallest
set of formulas that is closed under subformulas such that 1) it contains ϕ0; 2) it contains
⊤; 3) if K∗Gψ ∈ Cl(ϕ0), then KG(ψ ∧ K
∗
Gψ) ∈ Cl(ϕ0); and 4) if KGψ ∈ Cl(ϕ0), then
Kaψ ∈ Cl(ϕ0) for all a ∈ G. Formula ψ is a negated formula iff ψ is of the form ∼χ for
some formula χ. We define ψ˜ := ∼ψ in case ψ is not a negated formula and ∼˜χ := χ. Let
Cl∼(ϕ0) = Cl(ϕ0) ∪ {ψ˜ | ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ0)}. It can be shown easily that Cl
∼(ϕ0) is finite. We
denote Cl(ϕ0) as Φ and Cl
∼(ϕ0) as Φ
′ in the rest of the proof.
We define a finite canonical model as follows. The set of situations S is the set of all
independentGrFDE-pairs x = 〈xin, xout〉 such that xin∪xout = Φ
′. It can be shown that each
independent GrFDE-pair 〈Γ,∆〉 can be extended to an independent GrFDE-pair 〈Γ′,∆′〉
such that Φ′ ⊆ (Γ′ ∪ ∆′). Note that, for all x, xin contains always at least ⊤. Otherwise
⊤ ∈ xout and xin = ∅, but then
∧
xin ⊃
∨
xout is provable and so x is not an independent
pair.
The rest of the model is defined as follows. The Routley star is defined by x⋆ := 〈x⋆in =
{ψ ∈ Φ′ | ψ˜ ∈ xout}, (Φ
′ \ x⋆in)〉. It is easily seen that x is an independent GrFDE-pair and
thus an element of S in the finite canonical model. Let us show that the canonical Routley
star is of period two. It is clear that
˜˜
ψ = ψ for all ψ. Therefore, x⋆⋆in = {ψ ∈ Φ
′ | ψ˜ ∈ x⋆out}
= {ψ ∈ Φ′ | ˜˜ψ /∈ x⋆out} = xin.
Next, we define Raxy iff {ψ | Kaψ ∈ xin} ⊆ yin. Ra is reflexive thanks to (A6). The
group relations RG and R
∗
G are defined as in ordinary group models. The canonical valuation
is v : p 7→ {x | p ∈ xin} for p ∈ Φ and v : p 7→ ∅ otherwise.
It remains to be shown that, for all ψ ∈ Φ, ψ ∈ xin iff x v ψ (the Truth Lemma).
For propositional variables, this holds by definition. It is easily seen that ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ xin iff
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both ϕ,ψ ∈ xin and ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ xin iff at least one of ϕ,ψ is in xin, from which the claims for
conjunctions and disjunctions follow. The claim for ⊃ is similarly easy (it follows from from
the fact that FDE proves all positive classical tautologies—including ⊤ ⊃ (ϕ∨(ϕ ⊃ ψ))—and
the fact that ⊤ ∈ xin for all x ∈ S).
The claims for the modal operators are established as follows. If Kaϕ ∈ Φ, then Kaϕ ∈ xin
implies x v Kaϕ by definition of Ra. To establish the converse implication, it is sufficient to
observe that, if Kaϕ /∈ xin, then 〈{ψ | Kaψ ∈ xin}, {ϕ}〉 is an independent pair. Hence, it can
be extended to a pair 〈Γ,∆〉 such that Φ′ ⊆ (Γ ∪∆). Take yin = Γ ∩ Φ
′ and yout = ∆ ∩ Φ
′.
It is clear that y = 〈yin, yout〉 is an element of the canonical model such that Raxy and that
y 6v ϕ (by the induction hypothesis).
The case of KGϕ ∈ Φ where G is not a singleton follows from (A7), the definition of
RG and the induction hypothesis (for Kaϕ, a ∈ G; note that we may use the hypothesis as
KGϕ ∈ Φ implies Kaϕ ∈ Φ for all a ∈ G).
Finally, take K∗Gϕ ∈ Φ. If K
∗
Gϕ ∈ xin, then x v K
∗
Gϕ by the fact that KG(ϕ∧K
∗
Gϕ) ∈ Φ
and the induction hypothesis for KG. The converse entailment is established as follows. For
each non-empty Z ⊆ S and y ∈ S of the finite canonical model, define
ϕy :=
∧
yin ϕZ :=
∨
y∈Z
ϕy
We sometimes write y instead of ϕy and Z instead of ϕZ . Take Z := {y | R
∗
Gxy} and assume
that ϕ ∈ yin for all y ∈ Z. We have to prove that K
∗
Gϕ ∈ xin.
Lemma 1. GrFDE proves Z ⊃ KG(ϕ ∧ Z).
Before proving the lemma, we show how it is applied. Using the Induction Rule (R3) and the
fact that x ∈ Z, we obtain ⊢ x ⊃ K∗Gϕ. Hence, K
∗
Gϕ must be in xin, otherwise x would not
be an independent pair.
Proof of Lemma 1. We write XGY if, for all x ∈ X, if RGxy, then y ∈ Y . We prove the
following claim.
Lemma 2. If XGY , then GrFDE proves X ⊃ KGY .
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove that if XGY , then GrFDE proves X ⊃ KaY for all a ∈ G; the
desired result then follows by applying axiom (A7). The proof is by reductio ad absurdum.
Assume that GrFDE does not prove X ⊃ KaY . Then there is w ∈ X such that GrFDE
does not prove w ⊃ KaY . This means that 〈{ψ | Kaψ ∈ win}, {ϕz | z ∈ Y }〉 is an independent
pair extendible to 〈Γ,∆〉 such that Γ ∪∆ contains Φ′. Take y = 〈Γ ∩ Φ′,∆ ∩ Φ′〉. It is clear
that Rawy and so, by our assumption, y ∈ Y . However, this means that GrFDE proves
ϕy ⊃ ϕY and so y cannot be an independent pair. This is a contradiction. Hence, Lemma 2
is established.
We continue the proof of Lemma 1. Note that ZGZ, so GrFDE proves Z ⊃ KGZ by
Lemma 2. Moreover, our assumption that ϕ ∈ yin for all y ∈ Z implies that GrFDE
proves Z ⊃ ϕ. Using monotonicity and regularity of KG, we infer that GrFDE proves
KGZ ⊃ KG(ϕ ∧ Z). Hence, GrFDE proves Z ⊃ KG(ϕ ∧ Z) as desired. This concludes the
proof of Lemma 1 and completeness is established.
Our proof shows that the LGr-theory of group frames is recursively axiomatizable and the
axiomatization is complete with respect to a recursively enumerable set of models (models
based in finite group frames). Hence, the theory is decidable.
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Theorem 2. GrUpFDE is a sound and weakly complete axiomatization of the LGrUp-theory
of all group update frames. The theory is decidable.
Proof. Assume that ϕ0 is not provable in GrUpFDE. Define the finite canonical model
based on the closure of ϕ0, Φ, and the ∼-closure of Φ, which we denote Φ
′, as in the proof
of Theorem 1. Moreover, let RxY z iff there are prime GrUpFDE-theories Γ,Σ and ∆i for
i ∈ I such that
(a) for all ϕ\ψ, if ϕ\ψ ∈ Γ and ϕ ∈
⋂
i∈I ∆i, then ψ ∈ Σ; and
(b) xin ⊆ Γ, (Σ ∩ Φ
′) ⊆ zin and, for all ∆i there is yj ∈ Y such that (yj)in ⊆ ∆i.
(A similar definition appears in [10].) We have to show only that the Truth Lemma holds for
ϕ\ψ ∈ Φ. If ϕ\ψ ∈ xin, RxY z and ϕ ∈
⋃
{yin | y ∈ Y }, then ψ ∈ zin by the definition of the
canonical R. Conversely, we reason similarly as in [29, 256]. First, assume that ϕ\ψ ∈ xout.
Extend x to a prime theory Γ. Second, extend the independent pair 〈{χ | ϕ\χ ∈ Γ}, {ψ}〉
to a prime theory Σ. (The proof that it is an independent pair uses (A9) and (R4); the case
{χ | ϕ\χ ∈ Γ} = ∅ uses (R5).) Third, take the set Λ = {α | ∃β(β /∈ Σ & α\β ∈ Γ}. For each
αi ∈ Λ, ϕ ⊃ αi is not provable. (If some ϕ ⊃ αi were provable, then βi ∈ Σ by (R4).) Hence,
extend each pair 〈{ϕ}, {αi}〉 to a prime theory ∆i. It follows from the construction of Σ and
∆i that (a) holds for Γ, {∆i}i∈I ,Σ. (If Λ = ∅, then {∆i}i∈I = ∅ and so each α ∈
⋂
i∈I ∆i;
but in this case also α\β ∈ Γ implies β ∈ Σ.) Moreover, ϕ ∈
⋂
i∈I ∆i by the construction of
∆i. Finally, take (yi)in = ∆i ∩ Φ
′ and (yi)out its complement relative to Φ
′ and similarly for
z and Σ. It is clear that ϕ ∈ (yi)in for all i ∈ I and ψ /∈ zin. This concludes the proof of the
Truth Lemma.
Our proof establishes that the LGrUp-theory of group update frames is recursively axiom-
atizable and the axiomatization is complete with respect to a recursively enumerable set of
models (models based on finite group update frames). Hence, the theory is decidable.
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